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LEVINAS AND THE IMMEDIACY OF THE FACE 
Merold Westphal 
Although he is a critical of the philosophical tradition as such French col-
leagues as Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard, the work Jewish philosopher 
Emmanuel Levinas is as constructive as it is deconstructive, precisely on the 
question of ethics, rendered so problematic by the others. His phenomenology 
of the ethical significance of the face of the Other not only provides an 
approach to the "foundations" of ethics quite different from that of traditional 
ethical theory; it also provides a powerful critique of the tendency of religion 
to lapse into theories about God at the expense of love for God's children. 
'" the view that there is nothing external to experience-no World of 
Forms, City of God, independent cog ito, a priori category, transcenden-
tal Mind, or far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves, but 
only the mundane business of making our way as best we can in a 
universe shot through with contingency. 
All "homes" are in finite experience; finite experience as such is home-
less. Nothing outside the flux secures the issue of it. 
Just as much of American culture and society looks like a concerted effort to 
refute the claim of Jesus that "one's life does not consist in the abundance of 
possessions" (Luke 12: 15), so much of contemporary French philosophy 
(often designated by such umbrella names as poststructuralism or postmod-
ernism) looks like a concerted effort to refute the claim that frames the book 
of Revelation, "I am the Alpha and the Omega" 0:8, 21:6, and 22:13; cf. 
1:17-18). 
Through loyalty to (or entrapment in) the metaphysical traditions of which 
they are so sharply critical, philosophers like Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard 
prefer Greek to Hebrew. So their assault is on the notions of arelle and telos. 
In its search to establish the primacy of unity over plurality, uni vocity over 
equivocity, stability over flux, and so forth, Western metaphysics has regu-
larly resorted to the notion of an ultimate origin to be the foundation of 
everything or an ultimate goal to be the harmonization of everything, or, 
typically, both. But there is no pure origin, divine (creator) or human (eogito); 
the only beginnings we can find are relative beginnings, themselves grounded 
in that which precedes them. Nor is there any goal by which experience or 
reality can be, to use the official term, totalized. All such ends represent the 
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wishful thinking of finite parts to be the whole, the effort of centers of force 
which can see that they are not the arche to be the telos. The foundationalism 
of which Descartes is the paradigm, and the eschatological holism of which 
Hegel and Marx are the paradigms are so riddled with paradox and paralogism 
that we must eschew the comfort they provide and accept our ultimate home-
lessness. Neither path leads to Absolute Knowledge, but only to other paths. 
The earth stands on the back of an elephant and-here's the kicker-it's 
elephants all the way down. 
This line of thought, so nicely summarized in the quotations at the begin-
ning of this essay, can be called contemporary French negativism. It is a series 
of critiques of pure reason emphasizing the wounded character of reason, its 
situatedness and thus its particularity, its fractured character and thus its 
plurality. Reason is always indebted, both to the past, by which it has been 
constituted, and to the future, which holds all its unfulfilled promissory notes. 
A number of observations can be made about this French radicalism, whose 
American enthusiastists sometimes bill themselves as intellectual terrorists. 
1) Only the details of its critique are distinctive. For example, the two 
quotations at the beginning of this essay, which the reader is no doubt quite 
prepared to attribute to Derrida, or Foucault, or Lyotard, are not about French 
postmodernism at all. The first is Louis Menand's definition of American 
pragmatism and the second a quotation from William James in support of it. l 
Furthermore, the repudiation of foundationalism is a staple of American phi-
losophy from Peirce to Plantinga, and the repudiation of Hegelian holism is 
perhaps the only theme common to all forms of "analytic philosophy" from 
Moore and Russell to the present.2 
2) French negativism refuses, persistently and explicitly, to draw the con-
clusion its opponents would like to foist upon it, a certain kind of nihilistic 
relativism. Its exponents are relativists insofar as they make the claim that 
we have access to no absolute standpoint. But they refuse to infer that every 
point of view or every practice is just as good as any other. They insist on 
making distinctions even while admitting that they have no absolute criteria 
for doing so. Intellectual life is not exempted from the riskiness of life in 
general. 
For example, Lyotard argues that moral judgments can never be grounded 
or justified. Ought can never be derived from is, that is, prescriptions expres-
sive of justice can never be "derived from other propositions, in which the 
latter are metaphysical propositions on being and history, or on the soul, or 
on society."3 This repUdiation of justification by derivation can be fruitfully 
compared with the critique of evidential ism found in Faith and Rationality, 
edited by Plantinga and Wolterstorff. But just as the writers in that volume 
do not draw nihilistic conclusions from the failure of a particular, exorbitant 
scheme of justification, so Lyotard does not repudiate the responsibility of 
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being just and of making moral judgments, but rather asks how to exercise 
this responsibility in the absence of the kinds of grounding philosophers have 
traditionally sought to provide. 
3) The secularism of French negativism rests upon a rather blatant non 
sequitur. Its proponents often sound like Nietzsche's Zarathustra, who says, 
"if there were gods, how could I endure not to be a god! Hence there are no 
gods."4 They often talk as if from their own confessed inability to embody 
an absolute standpoint, to see the world sub specie aeternitatis, it follows 
that there is no such standpoint. Had they looked back behind Nietzsche to 
either Kierkegaard or Kant they would have discovered another possibility, 
the more plausible suggestion that from the impossibility of our own finite 
temporality's ever seeing the world from the perspective of infinite eternity, 
nothing whatever follows about the possibility that God might be able to see 
the world from such a divine point of view. Thus Kierkegaard, for whom the 
phrase 'humanly speaking' is important rather than redundant, has Johannes 
Climacus claim that reality is a system for God even if never for us as existing 
individuals, and Kant converts the distinction between the human perspective 
we embody and a possible divine perspective we do not into the central 
distinction of the critical philosophy, that between appearances and things in 
themselves. 5 
Against Hegelian monism, French negativism untiringly insists on the ir-
reducible plurality of human meanings, perspectives, criteria, and so forth. 
But by never questioning the Hegelian view that the human is the measure 
of all things they betray how incomplete is their break with Hegel and how 
dogmatic is the atheistic framework in which they set their thought. 
There is a double importance in noting the nOll sequitur underlying what I 
have been calling French negativism. First, it deprives these traditions of any 
pretensions, whether by the main characters or their followers, of having 
shown the preferability of atheism to theism. Second, and more important in 
my view, it deprives theists of an easy excuse for dismissing their thought. 
If there were a substantial link between this radical finitism and atheism, the 
plausibility of theism and French negativism would vary more or less in-
versely. But if there is no such link, the story is quite different. When the 
attempt to act as if 
A - there is no arche or telos, no pure origin or ultimate end 
followed from 
B - we do not preside over or have access to any such origin or end 
is explicitly repudiated, that is to say, when B no longer has A hanging around 
its neck as an albatross, B can be looked at more dispassionately and less 
defensively by Christian philosophers. And when that happens, the case for 
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the incorrigible finitude of human knowledge emerges, I believe, with new 
power and nuance. Theistic philosophers have every reason to take these 
critiques, as expressed in B, with great seriousness. For they clearly have 
theological import, and they just might be true. 
That deconstructive strategies and insights are not essentially linked to the 
secular assumptions that seem to prevail in a French negativism with deep 
roots in Nietzsche and Heidegger has been brilliantly argued by Kevin Hart 
in The Trespass of the Sign (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 
and brilliantly demonstrated by Jean-Luc Marion in God Without Being, trans-
lated by Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991). In 
other words, if the previous observation suggests that French negativism does 
not obviously have the nihilistic import often attributed to it by its enemies, 
this observation suggests that it does not have the atheistic import often 
attributed to it by both its fans and its foes. 
4) French negativism can be fruitfully compared with what I shall inevita-
bly have to call German positivism, though it has nothing to do with positiv-
ism in the usual sense. Two major moments in contemporary Germany 
philosophy, the hermeneutics of Gadamer and the critical theory of Jiirgen 
Habermas, share with French negativism a commitment, at once anti-
Cartesian and anti-Hegelian, to the ineluctable finitude of human knowledge. 
Both are as allergic to Descartes as any contemporary philosopher, and while 
both are deeply indebted to Hegel, they are both closer to Kantian finitism 
than to Hegelian absolutism. We might call them Hegelians without the 
Absolute. 
There is a good deal of bad blood between French negativism and both of 
these German traditions. 6 But looked at closely, the ongoing debate seems to 
be between two parties who are in essential agreement about how much water 
is in the glass, but who insist, on the one hand, that it is half empty, and on 
the other hand, that it is half full. While hermeneutics and critical theory 
share with French postmodernism a repudiation of both foundationalism and 
totalizing holism, their tendency is to emphasize what we can have and not 
to linger as long on what we cannot. For both Gadamer and Habermas the 
concept of Verstiindigung, of coming to an understanding with others, is 
important. Of course, no such understanding is final, beyond challenge and 
revision; but then, neither is it nothing. The homes created by tradition, 
consensus, and even compromise may be, as James suggests above, them-
selves homeless; but, insist Gadamer and Habermas, people live in them 
nevertheless.7 
What I have called French negativism does not exhaust the scene in con-
temporary French philosophy. Two major figures, Ricoeur and Levinas, have 
much in common with Gadamer and Habermas in the sense that they, too, 
can be called the-glass-is-half-full philosophers. Both share the anti-
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Cartesian, anti-Hegelian stance of their French colleagues, but, like their 
German colleagues, they also insist that philosophical thought can be con-
structive as well as deconstructive. Perhaps it is not surprising that these two 
philosophize out of a deep sympathy rather than a deep hostility toward 
religion. Ricoeur's attempt to develop a philosophical hermeneutics has im-
portant links to Gadamer's similar project. Both of these are discussed else-
where in this issue. The remainder of this essay will be devoted to the 
constructive themes of Levinas against the background of French negativism, 
with whose basic negations (proposition B above) he agrees. 
Emmanuel Levinas is a Lithuanian Jew who, after high school education 
in both Hebrew and Russian schools, went to France for his university edu-
cation and has lived his adult life there. He studied under both Husserl and 
Heidegger in Freiburg and was a major figure in introducing their work to 
France. For decades he has been an important figure in two rather distinct 
groups in Paris, the philosophers, from Sartre and Merleau-Ponty through 
structuralism to poststructuralism, and the Jewish intellectuals. Although his 
most important work, Totality and Infinity, was translated into English in 
1969, it has been primarily during the 80s that he has emerged as a major 
figure on the American scene. His impact continues to grow steadily. 
The Preface to Totality and Infinity opens with the following sentence: 
"Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know 
whether we are not duped by morality" (TI p. 21).8 In the next paragraph we 
find politics presented as "opposed to morality" but tightly wedded both to 
war and to reason; and before we get past the first page we read, "The visage 
of being that shows itself in war is fixed in the concept of totality, which 
dominates Western philosophy." 
Since politics is defined as "the art of foreseeing war and of winning it by 
every means," it is not surprising that politics is opposed to morality. But the 
linkage of politics, so construed, to reason and Western philosophy is, as it 
is meant to be, shocking. 
The clue to the linkage is the notion of totality. In concert with his French 
negativist colleagues and against the background of Nietzsche and Heidegger, 
Levinas will develop his own critical narrative of Western philosophy as the 
will to power dressed up as the Logos. Its attempts to totalize the world and 
our experience of it, to make everything fit within its conceptual schemes, 
are seen as a series of attempts to make the world safe for a Self unimpeded 
by any Other which is not its own other, that is, the necessary condition for 
its own possibility, something to be used, possessed, enjoyed. While meta-
physics is the desire "toward somethillg else entirely, toward the absolutely 
other" (TI p. 33), Western ontology has systematically reduced the Other to 
the Same.9 
Whereas Nietzsche aims his critique of the Western logos at Christianity 
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and Platonism, and Heidegger aims his at Nietzsche himself, as the one who 
culminates these traditions by simply reversing their valuations, Levinas di-
rects his critique especially at Husserl and Heidegger, the most powerful 
recent expressions of the totalizing tendencies of Western ontology. 
I shall not give separate attention to Levinas' critique of Western philoso-
phy, which will emerge quite naturally as we focus on his constructive 
themes. But it is this critique that is the common ground between Levinas 
and the French postmodernists. In the aftermath of their critiques, the increas-
ingly pressing question during the 80s has become, How is ethics possible if 
reason is so deeply wounded? It is just this question that is posed by the 
opening sentence of Totality and Infinity in 1961, prior to the postmodern 
corpus of Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard. 1o 
As his colleagues will do later, Levinas gives a special twist to this ques-
tion. In the context of the Enlightenment project, the question would be 
parsed something like this. For an increasingly secular modernity, God cannot 
be the source and guarantor of moral norms, so reason, make that Reason, 
will have to take over those responsibilities. But if Reason is deeply wounded, 
if it turns out to be merely reason, or worse, your reason, my reason, their 
reason, and our reason, each of which is a bundle of unfulfilled promises, 
what is to keep the moral life from lapsing into nihilistic cynicism? Or, to 
use Levinas' own language, what is to keep ethics from degenerating into 
politics? 
The question presupposes that Reason is the ally of the Right and the Good. 
But, as we have already seen, Levinas challenges that assumption. The ethical 
life presupposes the ineliminable otherness of the Other, while the Western 
logos, which calls itself Reason, has consistently sought to reduce alterity to 
what can be "reabsorbed into my own identity as a thinker or a possessor" 
(TI p. 33). Thus the wounding of Reason that I have been referring to as 
negativism is for Levinas not merely the humility that acknowledges that 
human reason is human, all too human; it is also a necessary moment in 
making the modern world safe for the moral life. Only when the totalizing 
assault of Reason on the Other has been withstood is the way open for a 
genuinely reasonable ethics. 
But even if the wounding of reason is seen in a positive rather than a 
negative light, 11 the question remains, How, now that the framework within 
which Kantians debated utilitarians has collapsed, is ethics possible? In this 
context the question is an epistemological question. At issue is how I can 
know the Good, not how I can become good by bringing my actions and 
feelings into conformity with it. 
Levinas' answer, put in a vocabulary not his own, is that our most funda-
mental moral beliefs are properly basic. He agrees with Lyotard that an 
evidentialist justification of them is not possible. Not only can the imperatives 
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of the moral life not be derived form theoretical knowledge of any kind, but 
the attempt to do so puts us within the very (totalizing) framework that makes 
ethical transcendence impossible by reducing the neighbor to a moment in 
our conceptual scheme. 
But Lyotard's prescriptivism goes farther than this. It claims that "the 'you 
must' is an obligation that ultimately is not even directly experienced," that 
"the 'you must' is something that exceeds all experience."12 
Levinas bases his ethical cognitivism on a diametrically opposite claim. 
Not only is obligation directly experienced; it is the only thing that is directly 
experienced and, as such, it is (or deserves to be) the most fundamental 
element in all our language games and conceptual schemes. (See section 5, 
below.) 
In spite of his sustained critique of Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas insists, 
"I remain to this day a phenomenologist," defining phenomenology as "a way 
of becoming aware of where we are in the world" (FFL pp. 14-15). The claim 
that we have a direct experience of the "you must" is a phenomenological 
claim that has, for purposes of the present analysis, five moments. 
1) The first is the claim that "the absolutely other is the Other" (TI p. 39; 
cf. p. 71, LR p. 245). By invoking the difference in French between Autre, 
the other that may be either a person or a thing, and Aurrui, the other who 
may only be another person, Levinas situates his phenomenological claim in 
the domain where instead of being a subject representing objects we are a 
subject confronted by another subject, one who makes claims on US. 13 Since 
a phenomenological claim is always an invitation to look and see for our-
selves, this first moment tells us where we should be standing when we do 
our own looking. 
2) Second, it is the face of the Other that expresses this absolute otherness 
of the Other as an infinity that surpasses all attempts to relativize it by 
representing it. The face overflows the concept and thereby all my attempts 
to possess, to use, or to enjoy the Other. It is face to face with the Other that 
I encounter the claim that puts my project of being the center of the world 
in question. The immediacy of the ethical relation is not that of intuitionism, 
for it is not a proposition to which I have direct access. It is the infinity of 
another person incarnate in a face. Thus violence consists in seeing the Other 
not as a face but merely as a force (CPP p. 19).14 
3) The next moment concerns the content of the claim placed upon me as 
I encounter the Other face to face. The "primordial expression" of the face 
of the Other, his or her "first word" to me, is "you shall not commit murder" 
(TI p. 199; cf. pp. 216, 262, 303). This has the advantage of being very 
specific, but it seems a bit limited in scope. Have I really satisfied the claim 
of the Other, whose otherness regularly leads Levinas to use the term 'infi-
nite,' so long as I manage not to kill him or her? 
LEVINAS AND THE IMMEDIACY OF FACE 493 
Levinas provides glosses on his basic formula designed to steer us away 
from such a reading. It is "the face of the other who asks me not to let him 
die alone, as if to do so were to become an accomplice in his death. Thus 
[my emphasis] the face says to me: you shall not kill" (FFL p. 24; cf. p. 38). 
If indifference to the suffering of the Other compromises my obedience to 
the command, You shall not kill, it is clear that there is no short and simple 
way to fulfill it. The concept of infinite obligation returns dramatically. 
But Levinas pushes further and suggests that morally speaking I find myself 
a hostage, "responsible for what [others] do or suffer" (LR p. 101). Being a 
hostage is "like kinship, it is a bond prior to every chosen bond ... a respon-
sibility for the other, and hence a responsibility for what I have not commit-
ted, for the pain and the fault of others" (CPP p. 123). In making the claim 
that I am responsible for the deeds, even the fault of the Other, and not just 
the suffering and pain, there is not a hint that any paternalistic privilege 
attends this answerability. The point is simply that prior to any free choice 
by which I might assume, and perhaps in so doing set limits to my responsi-
bility for the life of the Other, I find myself the bearer of an unlimited 
obligation. 15 
Perhaps the best clue to the meaning of my responsibility for what the Other 
does is found in Levinas' preoccupation with Pascal's notion of "my place in 
the sun" and his commentary, which Levinas italicizes, "That is how the 
usurpation of the whole world began" (from Pellsees, Sec. 295). He adds (in 
the same paragraph which presents the face as "the other who asks me not to 
let him die alone"), "In ethics, the other's right to exist has primacy over 
my own" (FFL p. 24). But if the Other's right to exist is the right to a place 
in the sun, then killing, in the literal sense, is the ultimate but not the only 
violent violation. 
Levinas makes this clear when he returns to the same theme in another 
essay. "My being-in-the-world or my 'place in the sun,' my being at home, 
have these not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man 
whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world; 
are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing?" Corre-
spondingly, the ethical relation consists in a very specific fear, "the fear of 
occupying someone else's place with the Da of my Dasein" (LR p. 82). There 
are many forms of repulsing, many forms of excluding, many forms of strip-
ping, each of which denies to the Other that kind of a place in the sun where 
he or she has the human support needed to act well by all but the super heroes 
of the human race. I am responsible for what others do as well as for what 
they suffer, not because I am their moral guardian and supervisor, but because 
I am responsible for their place in the sun, its mere existence, yes, but also 
its quality. 
4) The fourth dimension of the Other's claim on me is its double asymmetry. 
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First of all, the Other is radically above me. The Other's claim comes as a 
command from "the Most High" (TI p. 34) whom I encounter as my lord and 
master (TI pp. 72, 75,101,213). This is a phenomenological, not a theological 
assertion. Levinas is not invoking God as the one who commands us to love 
our neighbor. He is claiming that the face of the neighbor confronts us not 
as a contractual proposal to be negotiated but as an unconditional obligation. 
It is unconditional in that its validity depends in no way either upon our 
agreeing to accept it or in the Other's doing something to evoke or merit our 
compliance. Levinas' complaint against Buber is that he overlooks this di-
mension of height in the ethical relation and makes reciprocity primordial 
(TI pp. 68-70; LR pp. 70-72; FFL p. 31). 
At the same time, the Other is as far below me as above me. Levinas stresses 
the nakedness of the face, the helplessness of the one who has nothing but a 
face upon which to base such a radical challenge to my own instincts of 
self-preservation and self-assertion. The Other has nothing to offer me, "no 
beauty, no majesty to catch our eyes, no grace to attract us to him" (Isa. 53:2). 
So Levinas insists that the Other is the stranger, the widow, and the orphan 
with whom the Bible is so concerned (TI pp. 74-78, 215). 
Majesty in destitution. This is the double asymmetry of the ethical relation. 
It may seem contradictory to attribute majesty to the face immediately after 
having denied it. But the majesty denied is what usually counts as such, 
beauty and sex appeal, power and strength, wealth and acclaim, and so forth; 
whereas the majesty affirmed is the majesty of the face as such, the naked 
face, a majesty possessed by even those faces that lack all those other 
"majesties."16 
5) Finally, and most importantly, not only do we experience this "you 
must," we have direct experience of the face and its claim. "The notion of 
the face ... finally makes possible the description of the notion of the imme-
diate ... The immediate is the fact to face" (TI pp. 51-52). 
The Hegelian-Heideggerian claim, against Descartes and Husser! respec-
tively, that nothing is immediate and that everything is mediated, was, in 
1961, when Levinas wrote this, and has been ever since, the Shibboleth of 
continental philosophy from existential phenomenology, hermeneutics, and 
critical theory through structuralism to the varieties of poststructuralism.1 7 
Especially in France, to be radical has meant to give unquestioning allegiance 
to this orthodoxy, which has long since passed from sect to church status. 
Levinas' move could hardly be bolder or more dramatic. 
"The fact of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic 
image it leaves me .... It does not manifest itself by these qualities, but 
1(0.8' o.me>. It expresses itself' (TI pp. 50-51; cf. CPP p. 20). In Plato and 
Aristotle 1(0.8' o.me> (per se, through or by means of itself) often designates 
the ontological immediacy of forms or substances that are self-sufficient with 
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regard to their existence. But it can refer to an epistemic immediacy, as in 
Republic 476b. 18 Here knowledge and opinion are being distinguished in 
terms of the difference between the philosophic few who can apprehend 
Beauty itself, and the lovers of sights and sounds who never get beyond 
"beautiful sounds and colors and shapes." The former must be able not only 
to apprehend Beauty itself (aUto 'to x:aA.bv), as distinct from beautiful 
things; they must also apprehend it directly, though itself (!Cae' aUto) and 
not through the mediation of those things.19 It is clearly this epistemic sense 
to which Levinas appeals. 
In the face, he claims, we have "an essential coinciding of the existent and 
the signifier. Signification is not added to the existent," as in language where 
the connection between meaning on the one hand and phoneme or grapheme 
on the other is arbitrary. Its signification, we might say, is built right into this 
sign. But this means that what this sign signifies, is itself. Hence the emphatic 
use of the concept of expression above. In this case, "to signify is not equiva-
lent to presenting oneself as a sign, but to expressing oneself, that is, pre-
senting oneself in person" (TI p. 262). 
This notion of being present "in person" lies at the heart of Husserl's 
phenomenological theory of evidence. For Husserl the "principle of princi-
ples" is this: "that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source 
of cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its 'personal' actu-
ality) offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted .... " Statements expressing 
such evidence provide "an absolute beginning called upon to serve as a 
foundation, a prillcipium in the genuine sense of the word."20 For Husserl 
perception (ultimately in all its modes) is "the essential possibility of [some-
thing] being simply intuited as what it is and, more particularly, of being 
perceived as what it is in an adequate perception, one that is presentive of 
that existent itself, 'in person,' without any mediation by 'appearances. "'21 
There are unmistakably Husserlian overtones to the claim that "knowledge 
in the absolute sense of the term, the pure experience of the other being, 
would have to maintain the other being !Cae' aVeo" (TI p. 65). And yet the 
claim that the face presents itself with this immediacy is presented as a 
critique of Husserlian, which is built on immediacy, as well as of Heideg-
gerian phenomenology, which is built on its denial. Levinas treats these two 
as an either/or he declines to accept. The one gives a foundationalist, idealist 
account of representation, the other an anti-foundationalist, anti-idealist ac-
count (which Levinas treats as stand-in for the whole anti-immediacy ortho-
doxy mentioned above, including French poststructuralism). 
But for Levinas the task is to get beyond the structure of representation 
that they share. Vis-a-vis the Other, consciousness "does not consist in equal-
ing being with representation, in tending to the full light in which this ade-
quation is to be sought, but rather in overflowing this play of lights-this 
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phenomenology" (TI p. 27). This is because the metaphysical/ethical relation 
"can not be properly speaking a representation, for the other would therein 
dissolve into the same .... To be sure ... usage objects, foods, the very world 
we inhabit are other in relation to us. But the alterity of the I and the world 
inhabited is only formal; as we have indicated, in a world in which I sojourn 
this aIterity falls under my powers" (TI p. 38),22 
The expression of the Other !Cae' amo represents, contra Husserl, a "mean-
ing prior to my Sinngebung and thus independent of my initiative and my 
power" (TI p. 51; cf. LR pp. 89-90). This notion of meaning that "does not 
refer to its constitution" and is "prior to all Sinngebung ... describes the very 
structure of a created being." Here "beings have a meaning before I constitute 
this rational world along with them. Creation is the fact that intelligibility 
precedes me .... This is not a theological thesis; we reach the idea of creation 
out of the experience of a face" (CPP p. 22). 
This same point can be expressed in other language. Ethics involves true 
transcendence "because the essential of ethics is in its transcendent intention, 
and because not every transcendent intention has the noesis-noema structure" 
(TI p. 29, my emphasis; cf. p. 49 as cited in note 22). Or again, "Here, contrary 
to all the conditions for the visibility of objects, a being is not placed in the light 
of another but presents itself in the manifestation that should only announce it; 
it is present as directing this very manifestation" (TI p. 65; cf. p. 74, where 
!Cae' amo is defined as "signifying before we have projected light upon it .... ") 
Levinas does not accept the Husserlian notion of a transcendental ego 
outside the worlds of both nature and history that can be an absolute origin 
of meaning. But in these passages he does not challenge such a notion. He 
concedes it for the sake of argument in order to point out that this theory of 
meaning is but a variation of reducing the other to the same, or, to be more 
specific, of reducing the Other to the meaning I give him or her. Like war, 
Husserlian phenomenology defaces the Other. 
Levinas associates Platonic and Hegelian idealism with the Cartesian-
Husserlian variety and arraigns them on similar charges. The Platonic doc-
trine of the kinship of the soul to the forms and the corresponding notion of 
knowledge as recollection replace transcendence with immanence. Because 
the Other's claim is '''older' than the a priori," a "reality that does not fit 
into any a priori idea, which overflows all of them" (LR p. 90, CPP p. 59), 
"the conversion of the soul to exteriority, to the absolutely other, to Infinity, 
is not deducible from the very identity of the soul, for it is not commensurate 
with the soul" (TI p. 61). If the Other is truly incommensurable with my own 
self-identity, then to welcome the Other is to learn something I didn't already 
know. Hence the sustained polemic against the Socratic reduction of teaching 
to maieutics (TI pp. 43, 51,171,180,204). Here too, as in war, the Other is 
defaced. 
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Unlike the Platonic soul or the Husserlian transcendental ego, Hegelian 
spirit is in history, or better, is history. Here idealism is the very opposite of 
escapism. But when Levinas looks to see whether there is room in this inn 
for the Other, he finds an all encompassing mediation that excludes the 
possibility of the face Ka8' aUto. So, against Hegel (and Marx, for that 
matter) he writes, "When man truly approaches the Other he is uprooted from 
history .... Interiority is the very possibility of a birth and a death that do not 
derive their meaning from history" (TI pp. 52, 55). In the Hegelian context, 
this is equivalent to claiming that the face of the Other "is by itself and not 
by reference to a system" (TI p. 75), that "the interlocutor appears as though 
without a history, outside of systems" (CPP p. 43). Or, finally, "The invoca-
tion is prior to the community" (CPP p. 4 I ).23 Since Hegel cannot grant the 
face this primacy over history, system, and community, Spirit becomes, in 
one of philosophy's most tragic ironies, the Other's nemesis. Although it is 
only ink and not blood that is spilled, at least in the first instance, once again. 
as in war, the Other is defaced. 
Heidegger's phenomenological destruction of the history of metaphysics 
puts him in direct conflict with the idealisms of Plato, Hegel, and Husser!' 
In Levinas' eyes he represents the most powerful alternative account of rep-
resentation; but at the same time he remains equally deaf to the call of the 
Other. 
"Since Husserl the whole of phenomenology is the promotion of the idea 
of horizon, which for it plays a role equivalent to that of the concept in 
classical idealism" (TI pp. 44-45). This is a surprising interpretation, for 
post-Husserlian phenomenology (not to mention structuralism and poststruc-
turalism) have waged a sustained assault on idealism's Concept, whether 
Plato's £t8o~, Hegel's 8egriff, or Husserl's Wesen under the banner of the 
Horizon and its numerous cousins. In fact, it can be said to be Husserl's own 
development of this notion that causes his quest for philosophy as rigorous 
science to unravel before his very eyes, especially in The Crisis of European 
Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy. The theme, developed in endless 
variations, is quite simple. Meaning is neither atomistic nor fixed. Therefore 
it is never immediate nor complete. This is because every focus of cognitive 
attention occurs against a background or in a context to which it is relative 
but which can itself never be fully thematized or turned into foreground. To 
put the point in terms of physical vision, one can never look at the boundary 
of one's visual field. Thus the concept can never have the clarity and distinct-
ness that all forms of idealism require of it, or, to put it in a different idiom, 
experience can never be totalized in the concept. Neither as an intuitionistic 
foundational ism nor as a dialectical holism can Absolute Knowledge be 
achieved. 
Since Levinas knows all this, why does he say that since Husserl (meaning 
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most especially Heidegger) "the idea of horizon ... plays a role equivalent to 
that of the concept in classical idealism" (my emphasis added)? It is because 
he asks whether the difference between Husserl and "after Husserl" makes 
any difference to the widow, the orphan, and the stranger. The post-Husser-
lians agree that cognition is always horizontal, incorrigibly contextual. But 
this is no help to the Other. The "ontological imperialism" (TI p. 44) of the 
horizon consists in the fact that "to recognize truth to be disclosure is to refer 
it to the horizon of him who discloses .... The disclosed being is relative to 
us and not !Cae' amo." This is because "we disclose only with respect to a 
project" and in disclosure we make the Other into a "theme for interpreta-
tion," whereas manifestation !Cae' amo "consists in a being telling itself to 
us independently of every position we would have taken in its regard, ex-
pressing itself' (TI pp. 64-65; cf. LR pp. 89-90). Where disclosure is hori-
zonal, "the possibility of a signification without a context" (TI p. 23; cf. CPP 
p. 65) becomes impossible. But this is the most important possibility of all, 
for this is precisely what is meant by !Cae' amo. By insisting on its possibil-
ity, Levinas renders himself a heretic in the eyes of the post-Husserlian 
church. 
As the previous paragraph suggests, 'disclosure' (erschliessen, Er-
schlossenheit) is the key term through which Heidegger expresses his ortho-
doxy on the question of context. 24 Levinas' sustained polemic against 
Heidegger takes the form of contrasting disclosure with the !Cae' amo of the 
Other's face, which in this context he regularly names revelation (TI pp. 
27-28,61-67,71-78). Because disclosure excludes revelation, it defaces the 
Other as much as the idealism it so deeply opposes. 
Although he regularly employs the notions of transcendence and revelation, 
Levinas remains clear that these are phenomenological and not theological 
claims and that they refer to bearers of the human face. What he calls "the 
Metaphysical" dimension of life is "an ethical behavior and not theology, not 
a thematization, be it a knowledge by analogy, of the attributes of God" (TI 
p. 78). What, then, is the religious significance of his thought? 
It is in this very context that he makes that clear. 
"To posit the transcendent as stranger and poor one is to prohibit the meta-
physical relation with God from being accomplished in the ignorance of men 
and things. The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face .... 
God rises to his supreme and ultimate presence as correlative to the justice 
rendered unto men ... the invisible but personal God is not approached outside 
of all human presence .... There can be no 'knowledge' of God separated from 
the relationship with men. The Other is the very locus of metaphysical truth, 
and is indispensable for my relation with God .... It is our relations with 
men ... that give to theological concepts the sole signification they admit of. ... 
Without the signification they drew from ethics theological concepts remain 
empty and formal frameworks" (TI 78-79). 
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In one of his Talmudic commentaries Levinas says that his 
"effort always consists in extricating from this theological language meanings 
addressing themselves to reason. The rationalism of this method does not, 
thank God, lie in replacing God by Supreme Being or Nature or, as some 
young men do in Israel, by the Jewish People or the Working Class. It consists 
first of all, in a mistrust of everything in the texts studied that could pass for 
a piece of information about God's life, for a theosophy; it consists in being 
preoccupied, in the face of each of these apparent news items about the 
beyond, with what this information can mean in and for man's life."25 
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In short, Levinas places his philosophy in the prophetic tradition, which 
asks of religious beliefs (as well as of religious practices), Are they good for 
the widow, the orphan, and the stranger, or do they, like war, deface the Other? 
At the heart of his phenomenological ethics is a hermeneutics of suspicion 
that knows how easily ontological theory, including the theological mode he 
calls "theosophy," can become the ideology of all the modes of violence 
against the Other he designates as "war." In the face of the Other, the sheer 
face of the helpless Other, he invites us to see the sacrilege of all such 
orthodoxies. 26 
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